



ON THE ROAD FROM SOCIALISM TO CAPITALISM: ATTITUDES OF YOUNG PEOPLE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ON ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE STATE

Na putu od socijalizma ka kapitalizmu: stavovi mladih u Bosni i Hercegovini o ekonomskoj ulozi države

ABSTRACT: *The paper aims to examine the intensity and spread of value orientations of economic liberalism and redistributive statism among young people in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) at three points in time – before the collapse of the socialist social order (1989), in the phase of consolidation of the neoliberal form of economic regulation after the effects of the global financial and economic crisis (2012), and after the economic crisis that came as a consequence of the coronavirus pandemic (2022). The theoretical framework of the analysis relies on the theory of normative-value dissonance (Lazić, 2011). We used summative scales of value orientations, where the data allowed for such analyses, and in other cases, we carried out simpler forms of descriptive analyses of individual items. The analysis of empirical data was carried out separately for three datasets: In the first one the data had been obtained through the research conducted in 1989 in BiH, then again in 2012 in the Doboje region in BiH, and the third time in 2022 in the entity of Republic of Srpska. The significance of the research relies on examining the attitudes of young people related to the economic role of the state during the establishment of neoliberal capitalism, which has been insufficiently explored in domestic sociology.*

KEY WORDS: *value orientations, socialism, capitalism, liberalism, normative-value dissonance, young people.*

APSTRAKT: *Cilj rada jeste da se ispita intenzitet i raširenost vrednosnih orijentacija ekonomskog liberalizma i redistributivnog etatizma kod mladih u Bosni i Hercegovini u tri vremenske tačke – pred raspad socijalističkog društvenog poretka (1989) i u periodu postsocijalističke transformacije, u fazi*

konsolidacije neoliberalnog oblika ekonomske regulacije nakon delovanja globalne finansijske i ekonomske krize (2012) i nakon ekonomske krize koja je nastala kao posledica pandemije korona virusa (2022). Teorijski okvir analize se oslanja na teoriju normativno-vrednosne disonance (Lazić, 2011). U analizi smo koristili sumacione skale vrednosnih orijentacija, tamo gde podaci dozvoljavaju izvođenje takvog oblika analize, a u drugim slučajevima smo izvodili jednostavnije oblike deskriptivne analize pojedinačnih stavki. Analizu empirijskih podataka smo izveli odvojeno za tri skupa podataka: prvi, koji je dobijen u istraživanju koje je izvedeno 1989. u Bosni i Hercegovini; drugi, koji je dobijen u istraživanju koje je izvedeno 2012. u regionu Doboja u Bosni i Hercegovini; treći, koji je dobijen u istraživanju koje je izvedeno 2022. u entitetu Republika Srpska. Značaj istraživanja počiva u ispitivanju stavova mladih o ekonomskoj ulozi države u periodu uspostavljanja neoliberalnog kapitalizma, što je nedovoljno istraženo u domaćoj sociologiji.

KLJUČNE REČI: *vrednosne orijentacije, socijalizam, kapitalizam, liberalizam, normativno-vrednosna disonanca, mladi.*

1. Introduction

The role of the state in economic processes is one of the most controversial issues not only in economic theory but also in the practice of organizing modern states. Since the end of the 18th century, economists, political philosophers, lawyers, sociologists, and politicians have dealt with this problem. During the last century, various economic paradigms were applied in practice – from those that consider state regulation of economic activities useful, to those that limit or prohibit them. Even within the same countries, in different socio-political circumstances, different economic strategies were applied (for example, in the USA in the 1930s and 1980s). Even today, after the collapse of state socialism and serious crises of liberal capitalism (twice in the past 15 years), this issue has not lost its importance. Quite the opposite, it seems that is more important precisely in those historical periods when the influence of the state in economic processes increases or when the state withdraws from economic regulation (Reiff, 2021). From this point of view, it is possible to distinguish two opposed political-economic paradigms – liberalism and statism.

The subject of the research are the attitudes of young people in BiH towards the economic role of the state in two different social systems – socialism (1989) and capitalism (2012 and 2022). The young people aged 18–29 in the studies from 2012 and 2022 represent generations that did not have the experience of living in socialism. Their growing up is associated with the period of establishing a new social system (capitalism), in the context of globalization and the dominant influence of neoliberal ideology. We will briefly reflect on the social context in which they grew up.

The post-socialist transformation of BiH was characterized by political interventions from international organizations (stronger than in any other republic of the former Yugoslavia), and the main direction of reforms was defined by neoliberal economic doctrine (Hudson, 2003). The key reform

measures were privatization, state deregulation, and market liberalization. State institutions remain weak, undermined by national political elites that interact with international capitalist institutions and organizations, adapting their clientism to externally imposed conditionalities. The state is organized as a pseudo international protectorate under the control of the Office of High Representative (OHR) and operated through the executive management of external organizations (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe – OSCE, international financial institutions – IFIs, European Union, etc). They provided state governance that reflects neoliberal policies and ideology that dominated the global economy (Pugh, 2002). External actors and domestic political elites navigated between state-building and diminishing the state's role as an economic actor by privatizing essential public services and state enterprises. This phenomenon is labelled as a “dysfunctional aspect of neoliberalism” in peacebuilding and post-socialist transformation (Pugh, 2002: 468). Alternative directions for post-socialist transformation, adapted to the inherited socio-economic system², cultural specifics, and historical heritage, were not taken into account (Bartlett, 2007).

In addition to social circumstances, the formation of young people's value systems is influenced by the normative-value system adopted through the education system. The education system in the post-Dayton period underwent a process of *neoliberalization*, involving reforms aligned with neoliberal ideology. Apple (2014) highlights four key principles of educational neoliberalization: opening education to the market and private capital, applying economic rationality in the education system, treating students as human capital, and the penetration of capital into schools. Of these four principles, three are easily recognizable in the education system in BiH, particularly the establishment of numerous private universities and secondary schools that train students for “in-demand occupations.” The strategic goal of the educational system reform is “to connect education with the labor market”³, while higher education institutions are faced with the imperative at lucrative grounds⁴. Concrete changes in the educational process include the introduction of entrepreneurial education (in vocational high schools and certain faculties), aiming to develop “entrepreneurial skills” and an inclination towards entering private businesses among a larger number of young people⁵.

2 The specificity of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian economy from the socialist era is that it relied on large industrial enterprises - conglomerates. The ten largest enterprises accounted for more than half of the social product (Džafić, 2006). Small private enterprises were neglected, comprising only 7% of economic entities in the former Yugoslavia (Jojić, Đerić, 1984).

3 Law on Higher Education of the Republic of Srpska (“Official Gazette of the Republic of Srpska,” No. 67/2020).

4 In an interview for RTRS on November 27, 2017, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Srpska emphasized “that we should start with education for professions for which there are guaranteed jobs,” and then “enable our own institutes and faculties to participate in quality projects to earn money for their faculties”. (<https://lat.rtrs.tv/vijesti/vijest.php?id=279917>). Accessed on November 24, 2023

5 Development Strategy for Small and Medium Enterprises of the Republic of Srpska for the period 2021-2027, pages 21-23. (<https://www.rars-msp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Strategija-MSP-2021-2027.pdf>). Accessed on November 23, 2023.

On the other hand, research on young people in the post-socialist period in BiH points to a harsh reality. Young people are massively facing the problems of unemployment⁶, long-term economic dependence on parents⁷, inability to solve housing issues, poverty, social exclusion, etc. (Popadić et al., 2005; Đurašinić et al., 2006; Janković, 2011; Žiga et al., 2015; Turčilo et al., 2019). From the Bosnian-Herzegovinian, and broader regional context, young people are considered one of the “most vulnerable groups” during the period of post-socialist transformation (Žiga et al., 2015: 14; Mihailović et al., 2004: 18).

The aim of the research is to determine whether there has been a change in the attitudes of young people about the economic role of the state during the period of post-socialist transformation compared to the socialist period. Because of the sample size and variations across three periods, the analysis serves only to capture general trends from the perspective of the youth.

2. Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework of the analysis relies on the theory of normative-value dissonance (Lazić, 2011). We accept a definition of values as „relatively stable, general, hierarchically organized characteristics of individuals (dispositions) and groups (elements of social consciousness), which are formed by the mutual action of historical, current-social and individual factors, and which, due to the attributed desirability, direct the behaviour of their bearers towards certain goals“ (Pantić, 1977: 277). Values could be observed as characteristics of social groups (not only individuals) and therefore connected to elements of social structure and patterns of legitimation of the existing social order. In this regard, Lazić and Pešić (2013: 288) are even more specific, considering that the position in the class hierarchy determines class interests, and class interests determine social action and the way of interpreting social reality. If there is an awareness of common interests, there is a greater or lesser willingness to defend them with joint efforts, to oppose the interests of a competing group/class, which is described by the concept of *action potential*. This concept represents „the degree of ability of a group to mobilize collective action in order to realize its members’ interests or to oppose such an action of a competing (opposing) group“ (Lazić, 1996: 272).

Similar is the case in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (<https://www.undp.org/bosnia-herzegovina/news/nova-%C5%A1kolska-godina-%E2%80%93-novi-izazovi-dvije-srednje-%C5%A1kole-u-kantonu-sarajevo-uvode-predmet-preduzetni%C5%A1tvo>). Accessed on December 1, 2023.

- 6 According to data from the Agency for Labor and Employment of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the youth unemployment rate in 2019 was 33.8%, and a year earlier, it was 38.8% (https://soc.ba/site/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Studija-javnih-politika-Unapredjenje-polozaja-mladih-u-FBiH_Web-.pdf), page 31. Accessed on December 28, 2023.
- 7 In a representative sample of 277 young people aged 18 to 35 in municipality of Doboj, conducted in 2008, it was found that 47.3% of young people “are financially supported by their parents,” while only 18.1% of young people “are completely financially independent, without any assistance.” 39.3% of young people “has no work experience.” Only 70.5% of the total employed have a stable job. The majority of young people “live with their parents, in their apartment/house” (75.5%) (Janković, 2011).

A prerequisite for the stable reproduction of the dominant order is that human action takes place following the ruling norms and value patterns. In these circumstances, there is mutual harmonization of normative-value patterns, so that norms represent a framework for determining what individuals and groups consider valuable, while internalized values help the survival of the normative system, and thus the entire social order (Lazić, 2011a; Lazić and Pešić, 2013). However, when there is a radical social change and the establishment of a fundamentally new type of social relations, there is also a change in the normative system. In the transition period, when a new normative system is being built, and the structural elements of the old order have not yet been dismantled, there is duality in the sphere of values⁸. The parallels between new and old normative systems, as well as between new and old value orientations, can lead to individuals and social groups acting within one normative system while retaining or adopting value orientations that conflict with that system. Lazić (2011) called this contrast *systemic normative-value dissonance*. On the empirical level, this term comes down to determining the degree of (in)compatibility of the value orientations of a specific class with the ruling normative system. A serious obstacle to social changes can be if, in the circumstances when a new system of social relations is being established, normative-value dissonance appears at the level of entire social classes, primarily those that are threatened by social changes. Inconsistency between values and norms can arise even without changing the social system, in a situation of its internal reorganization, without changing the basic principles on which it functions. Such a situation occurred in the capitalist system during the global financial and economic crisis that began in late 2008 and lasted until 2012. In the situation of global crisis, there are different, even contradictory norms at work according to which the capitalist system functions, and this differs from one country to another and from one part of the global capitalist system to another (center-periphery-semi-periphery) (Piketty, 2015: 506–514). Different normative patterns of the system may lead to the inability of foundation of a unique value system, which leads to a situation of *intra-systemic normative-value dissonance* (Lazić and Pešić, 2013). In a situation of global crisis, many countries in the center of the capitalist system reach for normative solutions that oppose the basic postulates of liberal capitalism⁹.

At this point, it is necessary to introduce another Lazić's concept into the analysis – the concept of *value inconsistency*, which we will use as an explanatory tool in the empirical part of our research. This term refers to the situation of supporting different, even potentially opposing value orientations, by some members or the entire social group/class. Intra-class consistency of value orientations is a

8 If no value system is established as dominant within a reasonable period of time, there may be serious problems not only for social changes but also for the survival of the entire social order.

9 We witnessed the “rescue” of large banks, insurance companies and national companies from collapse through state- interventionist measures. Not long after, numerous protectionist measures by the USA followed in order to protect the domestic economy from competitors (primarily China).

necessary assumption for collective action in the direction of promoting and protecting class interests (Lazić, 2011: 180–184; Lazić, 2011a: 137). We use two opposite value orientations, economic liberalism, and redistributive statism, to analyze the theory of normative-value dissonance.

3. Hypotheses

The end of the 1980s in Yugoslavia was marked by a deep crisis of legitimacy within the socialist order, which manifested itself in the spread of the values of economic liberalism (Lazić, 2011). Considering the liberal nature of Yugoslav socialism, the adoption of these values probably took place earlier, particularly among experts, the intelligentsia, artists, and political dissidents. By the late 1980s, liberal values were most prevalent within the ruling class. This was primarily driven by their desire to secure a more enduring (intergenerational) reproduction of privileged positions, especially in the face of socialism's collapse. Additionally, the lack of interest among the ruling class members in the ideological-political defence of the existing order (Lazić in: Lazić ed. 2000). The prevalence of liberal values also occurred among members of the middle class (mostly among experts) due to their interest in gaining greater autonomy from the ruling class, which would create conditions for a relative improvement of their economic position (Lazić, 2011). In contrast to this, greater resistance to liberal values emerged in the lower social strata, attributed to the strong adherence to values that oppose them, such as traditionalism, egalitarianism, solidarity, collectivism, and self-management awareness (see: Pantić, 1977; Lazić, 2011; Golubović and others, 1995). Research on the values of young people in Yugoslavia was quite widespread, but it did not delve into the assessment of the economic system and the role of the state in the economy. The furthest that was ventured in this regard was in research on the values of self-managed socialism in Croatia (Čulig, Fanuko, Jerbić, 1982: 90–97) and Serbia (Pantić, 1981: 42–44). Young people generally held positive attitudes toward this social system. They also positively assessed the role of state ownership in economic development (Čulig, Fanuko, Jerbić, 1982: 93; Pantić, 1981: 44). Several studies at the end of the 1980s indicated a significant decline in self-management orientation among young people in Serbia (according to: Pantić, 1990: 67), which probably also occurred in other republics. However, young people did not express widespread dissatisfaction with the socio-economic system, nor did they form a social group actively working on the dismantling of socialism. They were susceptible to the influence of Western values, primarily in culture, art, and music (Marković, 2012; Vučetić, 2012).

The first half of the 1990s was characterized by extremely unfavorable social circumstances for the development of systemic changes, including ethnic conflicts, the rise of nationalism, and the revival of traditional values such as religiousness, authoritarianism, and collectivism. Since nationalism and liberalism were opposite ideologies in specific social context during the 1990s, we assume that the incitement of nationalism was a hindering factor in the

acceptance of liberal values¹⁰. The last decade of the 20th century is usually referred to as the period of “blocked” post-socialist transformation (in the case of Serbia), or “slowed down” transformation (in the case of Croatia) (see: Lazić and Cvejić, 2004: 42–43; Sekulić, 2014). Although not described in the literature dealing with the post-socialist transformation of BiH, the concept of “blocked post-socialist transformation” can be applied to this country until 1998 as well, when the processes of privatizing state and public sector companies began. As a result, a different sequence and dynamics of value changes can be expected from those in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The late 1990s were marked with the “unblocked” social transformation of BiH, but still late compared to most post-socialist countries in East and Central Europe¹¹. The ultimate effects of social transformation were very modest (Donais, 2002; Bayliss, 2005; Hamm et al, 2012).

If we accept the thesis that generational attitudes are formed under the influence of the historical epoch in which they lived, the social system in which they grew up, the value-ideological orientations they adopted, and the expectations they held (Kuljić, 2009; Mannheim, 1972), then it is justified to expect that the attitudes of the young generation about the economic role of the state in post-socialism (2012 and 2022) are different from those of young people during socialism (1989). More precisely, we expect a greater prevalence of liberal attitudes in post-socialism. Young people were socialized in a society where neoliberal ideology dominated public discourse (in the media, speeches of politicians, in the education system). If the assumption proves correct, it would mean a reduction in normative-value dissonance. On the other hand, the high unemployment and existential insecurity, that came as a consequence of economic crisis, may lead young people to express resistance to the neoliberal social order. From this perspective, it can be assumed that they would prefer the state to take a more active economic role, to support them in finding jobs or in solving existential problems. The contrast between neoliberal dogmatism¹² in public discourse and the difficult life realities of young people likely leads to the formation of inconsistent attitudes about the

10 In contrast, in Central Europe, the spread of liberal values happened right at the beginning of the transition, while there was strong ideological resistance to socialism and Soviet domination (Lazić, 2005: 105).

11 It turned out that the initial advantages that the countries of Central Europe gained by starting the transformation processes earlier (in the first half of the nineties) were irreplaceable in a short period of time, which became more visible after they entered the EU in 2004 and 2007, when their development additionally intensified.

12 “The neoliberal dogma” involves the systematic implementation of political measures rooted in neoliberal ideology. These measures encompass the privatization of state enterprises and public services, state deregulation, market liberalization, a flexible labor market, and a reduction of social programs. Advocates often emphasize their necessity and inevitability for economic growth. However, there is often insufficient consideration given to the harmful consequences of such policies, including an unfair distribution of public resources, a substantial growth of economic inequalities, environmental issues, and a lack of empathy and solidarity with socially vulnerable groups (refer to detailed analyses for BiH: Pugh, 2002; Hudson, 2003).

economic role of the state. Parallel to the generational approach in research, we will use class analysis, because value systems and social awareness are determined by the position of individuals and groups in the class structure of society (Pantić, 1977).

We expect a more ready acceptance of liberal values in the upper social strata, the so-called „winners of the transformation“, while the lower strata, the so-called „losers of the transformation“ will be less likely to accept those normative solutions that permanently endanger their material position. This is because market regulation leaves many without employment, lowers the price of labor, especially manual labor, etc., and makes their prospects on the labor market permanently uncertain (cf. Lazić and Cvejić, 2004; Lazić and Pešić, 2013). We believe that this will be reflected in a greater acceptance of redistributive statism than economic liberalism. It should also be noted that the global economic crisis (2008–2012) and the economic crisis that came as a consequence of the Covid-19 pandemic (2020–2022) contributed to the strengthening of this trend. State interventionism and protectionist measures have been used as an anti-crisis measure in a number of liberal-capitalist countries in recent years, which is in direct opposition to neoliberal economic principles (Piketty, 2015).

Our assumption is that the effect of the economic crisis in the area of dominant social values will manifest itself through the appearance of intrasystem value-normative dissonance, primarily in the area of economic regulation, through the weakening of support for liberal values and the emergence of inconsistent value patterns. In other words, we expect support for state regulation, especially from the existentially threatened population. It is important to note that this is not about any attempt to „overthrow capitalism“, but about seeking a solution within the existing, normative-institutional system¹³. Neither in the global nor in the local framework was there any social group that would be able to carry out such a turnaround (create a new way of producing social life, build an alternative system of social relations, achieve the necessary level of action potential to carry out a turnaround, etc.), nor were the objective socio-historical circumstances created for such an undertaking to be possible (cf. Lazić and Pešić, 2013: 287).

Finally, one should not ignore the failed expectations of the population (especially young people) regarding the growth of living standards, slow economic recovery and deepening economic lagging behind the developed Western countries – the „center“ of the global capitalist system (cf. Lazić and Pešić, 2013: 284– 286; Vratuša, 2012; Sekulić, 2014). Therefore, the possible support for redistributive values by the respondents could be interpreted as a request for greater participation of the state in the regulation of the normative-institutional system.

13 Although since 2008, more mass protests of workers and vulnerable populations have been organized throughout Europe (in Spain, Greece, Portugal, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, etc.), they have not shaken the capitalist order much.

4. Methodological remarks

The empirical data was collected in three studies. The first research is *Changes in class structure and mobility in the SFRY*, which was conducted in 1989. From that sample, we selected a sub-sample of young people in Bosnia and Herzegovina aged 18–29 and it was 559 respondents. The sample was of the quota type, and the basis for the quotas was the classes that were operationalized through the workplaces of the respondents¹⁴.

The second research, *Changes in value orientations and attitudes towards social changes among young people in the Dobož region*, was, due to financial and organizational reasons, carried out on the territory of the Dobož region (municipalities of Dobož, Dobož East, Dobož South and Usora). The sample was stratified, with a stratum proportional to size, and consisted of 553 respondents. Stratification was performed by combining the socio-economic and territorial affiliation of the respondents, and the sample is representative according to these criteria.

The third survey, *Value orientation of voters and abstainers in the Republic of Srpska* was conducted immediately after the general elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2022. The survey was conducted through the Google Forms platform. The sample consists of 520 respondents in the territory of the Republic of Srpska aged 18 to 29. The data from the first research are secondary, while those from the second and third are primary, collected exclusively for the purpose of writing this paper.

We derived the scales of *economic liberalism* and *redistributive statism* from research in Serbia (Lazić, 2011), as well as from our own research in the Republic of Srpska (Janković, 2016; 2020). The scale of *economic liberalism*¹⁵ expresses a positive attitude towards private property and non-interference of the state in economic processes and the work of private companies. It is operationalized using three items:

1. Social progress will always rest on private property (1989, 2012, 2022) (expresses a liberal view).
2. The less the government intervenes in the economy, the better for Republic of Srpska (2012, 2022) (expresses a liberal view) / The state today must have a greater role in managing the economy (1989) (expresses an anti-liberal view).
3. The government should not control, regulate or in any other way interfere with private companies (2012, 2022) (expresses a liberal view) / Complete independence of labor collectives from the state is a condition for economic growth (1989) (expresses a liberal view).

14 For more detailed information on the research, see: Hodžić, 1991.

15 The scale of economic liberalism had a low reliability coefficient in 1989 ($\alpha=0.393$) and in 2012 ($\alpha=0.338$), but it was higher in 2022 ($\alpha=0.650$). Therefore, the analysis of data for 1989 and 2012 will be based on individual items. For the data from 2022, we can use the sum scale (explains 58.6% of the variance). It is a one-factor scale, and the characteristic root is 1.759.

The scale of *redistributive statism*¹⁶ expresses the necessity of state redistribution in order to help the lower social classes and those who cannot manage in the market competition. It consists of three items:

1. The government should provide jobs for everyone who wants them (2012, 2022) (expresses redistributive statism).
2. The government should guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living (2012, 2022) (expresses redistributive statism).
3. *Government should intervene to reduce inequalities and protect the poor and weak* (2012, 2022) (expresses redistributive statism).

In surveys conducted in 1989 and 2012, we used a seven-level model of class scale with the following classes: 1 – directors, politicians, large and medium-sized entrepreneurs; 2 – experts, lower managers; 3 – small entrepreneurs, self-employed; 4 – clerks, technicians; 5 – qualified and highly qualified workers; 6 – semi-skilled and unskilled workers; 7 – small farmers (for more details see: Lazić, 2011). The respondents' class position was determined based on their occupation and education. If they were unemployed, their class position was assigned based on the class status of their spouse (if married) or the class status of their parents (if living in the same household). In the 2022 study, we didn't have enough data to determine the class position of unemployed respondents. Therefore, this group was identified as a distinct category (Tables 1–5).

5. The results and discussion

5.1. Economic liberalism

Based on the data from the first two studies (1989 and 2012), we could not form a sum scale, due to the low reliability coefficient, so the analysis mainly relied on individual items. Of the three items in 1989, according to the average score, two items were in the zone of acceptance (3.25 and 3.65), and one was in the zone of rejection of liberal orientation (2.91), which tells us that our assumption about the spread of liberal values prior to the collapse of socialism was justified. However, not all dimensions of liberalism were accepted to the same extent. When asked about supporting private ownership because it brought social progress, 49% showed a liberal orientation. However, only 38.6% of respondents agreed that the state should have a greater role in economic management (for the first item, 30.5% of respondents rejected liberalism, and for the second, even 46.7%) (Tables 1, 2). There is a clear indication of substantial disagreement among the respondents concerning their acceptance of both items, and this is reinforced by the high standard deviations (1.560 for the item related to private property and 1.679 for the item regarding state management of the economy).

16 We did not have data on redistributive statism for 1989. The scale for 2012 has a tolerable reliability ($\alpha=0.641$), and explains 58.6% of the variance, it is a one-factor scale, and the characteristic root is 1.758. The scale for the year 2022 has a high level of reliability ($\alpha=0.774$). It is a one-factor scale with a characteristic root of 2.086 and explains 69.5% of the variance.

The item advocating the complete independence of companies from the state, as one of the basic principles of economic liberalism, is supported by 59.3% of respondents, while there are almost three times fewer respondents who oppose it (21.1%). This attitude is the most accepted of all attitudes in all three time points, which makes this item unique, with the average score of 3.65 (Table 3). The data we have presented so far point to the existence of normative-value dissonance due to the acceptance of economic liberalism in the period of socialism, but also to the existence of value inconsistency due to the acceptance of opposite views by the respondents.

In the following step of our analysis, we wanted to check if there were differences between the classes in the acceptance of economic liberalism. For this purpose, we applied the ANOVA, which showed that the difference exists only in the case of the item related to the state management of the economy ($F=3.394$; sig. 0.003), while Dunnett's T3 test (which assumes unequal variances of the data sets) showed that the mentioned difference is manifested in a greater acceptance of economic liberalism by members of the upper class compared to the lower working class (3.74 vs. 2.54), i.e. a higher acceptance by experts and lower managers compared to both strata of the working class (3.54 vs. 2.72 and 2.54). However, the assumption about the spread of liberal values in the upper classes was fulfilled only in the case of one statement, which is why we cannot draw a broader conclusion there.

Even though it was shown that the difference in the acceptance of liberal orientation within classes in three items is not statistically significant, it is still present¹⁷. To substantiate this, we will cite several examples. With the item that supports the independence of companies from the state, we have a situation where the upper class is more liberally oriented than the other classes (the average score in the upper class is 4.26 and at the sample level 3.65) (Table 3). With the item expressing support for private property, we have a situation where small private entrepreneurs and farmers are more liberally oriented than other groups (scores 3.92 and 3.75; the sample level average was 3.25) (Table 1). This forced us to examine whether private entrepreneurs and farmers are perhaps more liberally oriented than members of other classes. These were the only groups that based their economic activities on private property and outside the dominant system of social relations (Lazić, 1987). Since under socialism, these groups were economically marginalized, with numerous restrictions regarding their economic growth (limited size of property, number of employees in the private sector, etc.), it is logical to assume that their interest was the abolition of socialism and the establishment of a new social order in which they would be able to engage in private business more freely and without restrictions. To examine this, we transformed the class hierarchy into two groups, the first one containing small entrepreneurs and farmers, and the second, where all other groups belong – whose members perform their work activities mainly within the state and social

17 This was probably contributed by the high dispersion of results within individual classes for all three items (in some cases the standard deviation is above 1,500)

sectors and within the dominant system of social relationships. Then, using the T-test, we determined that the difference in the degree of acceptance of economic liberalism occurs regarding the item expressing support for private property ($t=2.520$; $p=0.012$), and it shows that private entrepreneurs and farmers accept liberal orientation more readily compared to all other groups (3.80 vs. 3.16). Although the conclusion could lead in the direction that „private owners“ (so-called „privatnici“) during socialism had more liberal views than groups that performed their work in the social and state sectors, such a generalization is not reliable without checking a larger number of statements.

Table 1. *“Social progress will always rest on private property” – arithmetic means and percentages (percentages refer to respondents who accept liberal orientation).*

Classes/strata									
Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Total
1989.	2,96	3,33	3,92	3,07	3,17	3,16	3,75	n.a.**	3,25*
2012.	3,18	3,09	3,40	3,24	3,40	3,36	3,14	n.a.	3,29*
2022.	4,22	3,06	3,45	3,18	3,12	3,00		3,11	3,14*
1989.	43,4	55,6	58,3	41,0	48,2	44,1	57,1	n.a.	49,0
2012.	36,3	30,2	40,0	36,8	50,3	50,0	35,7	n.a.	41,2
2022.	77,7	40,4	63,7	45,1	40,0	57,1		52,4	43,7

Classes/strata: 1 – directors, politicians, large and medium-sized entrepreneurs; 2 – experts, lower managers; 3 – small entrepreneurs, self-employed; 4 – officials, technicians; 5 – qualified and highly qualified workers; 6 – semi-skilled and unskilled workers; 7 – small farmers; 8 – unemployed.

*Scores from 1.00 to 2.00 indicate strong rejection, from 2.00 to 3.00 moderate rejection, from 3.00 to 4.00 moderate acceptance, from 4.00 to 5.00 strong acceptance of economic liberalism

**n/a = not available

Table 2. *“The state today must have a greater role in managing the economy” (1989) / “The less the government intervenes in the economy, the better for the RS/FBiH” (2012) – arithmetic means and percentages (percentages refer to respondents who accept liberal orientation).*

Classes/strata (as in the previous table)									
Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Total
1989.	3,74	3,54	3,08	2,92	2,72	2,54	3,04	n.a.**	2,91*
2012.	3,36	2,79	2,90	3,03	3,10	3,22	3,50	n.a.	3,08*
2022.	4,11	2,82	3,40	3,19	2,61	2,43		2,75	2,84*
1989.	65,2	48,1	41,6	38,0	36,3	27,9	35,7	n.a.	38,6
2012.	50,0	25,9	25,0	29,3	37,2	35,1	64,3	n.a.	34,5
2022.	77,7	34,0	50,0	36,5	26,1	28,6		30,0	32,5

*Scores from 1.00 to 2.00 indicate strong rejection, from 2.00 to 3.00 moderate rejection, from 3.00 to 4.00 moderate acceptance, from 4.00 to 5.00 strong acceptance of economic liberalism

**n/a = not available

Table 3. *“Complete independence of labor collectives from the state is a condition for economic growth” (1989) /*

“The government should not try to control, regulate or in any other way interfere in private companies” (2012) – arithmetic means and percentages (percentages refer to respondents who accept liberal orientation).

Classes/strata									
Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Total
1989.	4,26	3,65	3,50	3,74	3,56	3,68	3,68	n.a.**	3,65*
2012.	3,45	2,87	3,65	3,12	3,29	3,57	3,79	n.a.	3,22*
2022.	4,00	3,12	3,30	3,47	2,95	3,43		3,37	3,35*
1989.	82,6	57,4	50,0	63,0	58,1	57,4	50,0	n.a.	59,3
2012.	50,0	30,6	70,0	36,8	46,3	48,6	50,0	n.a.	42,1
2022.	66,6	43,1	50,0	47,1	45,4	57,2		49,5	48,8

*Scores from 1.00 to 2.00 indicate strong rejection, from 2.00 to 3.00 moderate rejection, from 3.00 to 4.00 moderate acceptance, from 4.00 to 5.00 strong acceptance of economic liberalism

**n/a = not available

In 2012, liberal orientation prevailed in the item expressing support for private ownership (3.29), as well as in the item regarding the non-interference of the government in the work of private companies (3.22) (Tables 1, 3). In the third item concerning government intervention in the economy, the average score was lower than in the previous two items, but it still indicated acceptance of a liberal orientation. (3.08) (Table 2).

In the context of the theory, we would say that normative-value dissonance had decreased. All three items that expressed economic liberalism were accepted by the majority, although liberalism became „shallow-rooted“. The number of its supporters was relatively low, although the average score in all three statements was above 3.00 (Tables 1–3). On the other hand, there was an increase in value consistency, which means that the respondents agreed more regarding the acceptance of liberalism than before the collapse of socialism (the standard deviation decreased significantly for all three statements).

Going further, we will examine whether there are differences in the degree of acceptance of the general principles of economic liberalism within the class hierarchy in 2012. Using ANOVA, we determined that there is no statistically significant difference in the degree of acceptance of private property among members of different classes and strata ($F=1.061$; $p=0.385$). The same situation is repeated when it comes to opposition to state interventionism in the economy ($F=1.460$; $p=0.190$). However, with the item expressing support for non-interference of the government in the work of private companies, a statistically significant difference between classes/strata appears ($F=2.864$; $p=0.009$), and Dunnett's T3 test showed that it is manifested in more liberal views among unskilled workers compared to the strata of experts and lower managers (3.57 vs. 2.87) (Table 3). Although there are no statistically significant differences regarding the acceptance of economic liberalism in other places within the class scale, they are present.

We could conclude that there is no discernible regularity in the prevalence of economic liberalism within the class hierarchy in 2012. We also examined whether there are any specific differences in the degree of acceptance of economic liberalism between upper classes and experts in relation to other social classes, or between small private entrepreneurs and farmers compared to other classes and strata. The T-test showed that there is a difference between members of the upper class, experts and lower managers, compared to members of other classes and strata when it comes to items about private property ($t = -1.892$; $p = 0.059$)¹⁸, and non-interference of the government in the work of private companies ($t = -2.134$; $p = 0.033$). Quite unexpectedly, members of the upper class, experts and lower managers are less liberally oriented than members of the lower classes (for the item related to the private property, the scores are 3.11 for the upper class and experts and 3.32 for the others, and for the item regarding the non-interference of the government in the work of private companies, the score for the upper class and experts is 2.99 and for the others 3.28). When it comes to small private entrepreneurs and farmers, given that they are firmly tied to the private sector, it would be logical to assume that they accept private property, non-interference of the state in the work of private companies, and that they are against state interventionism in the economy, more decisively than other social strata. Contrary to expectations, entrepreneurs and farmers to a greater extent than other strata only accept the position that the state should not interfere in the work of private companies, which can be interpreted as their assessment that state interventionism causes damage to the private sector ($t = 2.348$; $p = 0.019$; the average score for entrepreneurs and farmers is 3.71; and for others 3.18).

In 2022, the item expressing a positive view towards private property fluctuates in the zone of moderate acceptance. This item was accepted by almost half of the respondents in 1989, while in the period of post-socialist transformation, support is 10% lower, while at the same time there is a rise in the share of respondents who did not have a clear position – neither accepting nor rejecting private property as the foundation of social progress (about 1/3 of respondents). If we look at the second item, which refers to state interventionism in the economy, there is a noticeable fluctuation of respondents between support and rejection of state interventionism. In 2022, the percentage of respondents who are against state interventionism is lower (32.7%), than the percentage of respondents who accept this kind of economic policy (37.4%) (Table 4). In other words, we are faced with very strong support for state interventionism in the period of post-socialist transformation, which can be interpreted as the existence of intra-system normative-value dissonance. Support for state interventionism should be interpreted in the context of the increased expectation of citizens that the state intervenes in the economy to reduce the negative effects of the economic crisis, originally the one from 2008, and then those caused by the coronavirus pandemic, as well as the energy crisis and inflationary shocks that we have been facing in the last two years. Bearing in mind that attitudes are formed under the influence of emotions, it is realistic to expect that the population's fear of a

18 Borderline statistical significance.

deepening economic crisis is the result of greater support for state interference in economic processes. Since this position represents the basic principle of economic liberalism that cannot be linked to the economic crisis, nor to the necessity of state intervention in order to reduce the negative effects of the crisis, we believe that this position shows a weak spread of liberal orientations among respondents in the post-socialist period. Although one cannot speak of a normative-value dissonance in the post-socialist period, the shallow rootedness of liberalism and its constant maintenance at a low level do not support the restructuring of the economy and significant growth of the private sector.

The possibility of forming a summative scale of economic liberalism in 2022 enabled us to observe the acceptance and rejection of economic liberalism within the class structure of society on a broader basis.

Table 4. *Scale of economic liberalism (2022)*
– average standardized factor scores, arithmetic means and percentages
(percentages refer to respondents who accept liberal orientation).

Classes/strata									
Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Total
2022.	1,175	-0,012	0,348	0,166	-0,303	-0,435		-0,032	0,004
2022.	4,28	3,13	3,48	3,31	2,85	2,72		3,11	3,15*
2022.	85,7	51,1	66,6	50,0	36,3	33,4		46,6	47,9

*Scores from 1.00 to 2.00 indicate strong rejection, from 2.00 to 3.00 moderate rejection, from 3.00 to 4.00 moderate acceptance, from 4.00 to 5.00 strong acceptance of economic liberalism

The first thing to notice is that economic liberalism is more accepted by the upper and rejected by the lower classes/strata (not taking into account the unemployed) (Table 4). The exceptions are experts and lower managers, where, contrary to expectations, liberalism is less accepted compared to the upper class (managers and large entrepreneurs) and small entrepreneurs. Instead, according to the percentage of liberally oriented, they are equal to clerks and technicians. This can be explained by the fact that experts are mostly employed in the state and public sector, they are less exposed to market competition, and from that point of view, they give less support to neoliberal economic doctrine. On the other hand, it is the lowest among the working class and among small farmers, the very group whose economic activities are more oriented towards private companies or their own entrepreneurial endeavors. The greatest support for economic reforms comes from members of the upper class (managers and large entrepreneurs), but due to the small number of respondents in this class, we cannot make wider generalizations.

5.2. Redistributive statism

The redistributive role of the state is mainly related to the socialist period and normative– institutional solutions from that time, although even during the period of „blocked transformation“ in the first half of the 1990s, such a role was imposed as a precondition for the survival of a large part of the population in BiH. In fact, every major social crisis, such as the global

financial and economic crisis of 2008, as well as the recent economic crisis caused by the Covid-19 virus pandemic, as well as the energy crisis and inflation, raises the question of the extent to which the state should participate in mitigating the crisis, rehabilitating its consequences, to what extent it should help the economy and the population, especially socially vulnerable groups, by introducing various anti-crisis measures. We have already mentioned that the most economically-developed Western countries intervened in the economy (in the USA even private companies, insurance companies, and banks), but also helped the population in various ways so the negative effects of the economic crisis were felt as little as possible. However, the following analysis does not refer to such specific anti-crisis measures, but to the more permanent awareness of the population of former socialist country that the state should regulate economic processes, manage companies, employ the unemployed, and redistribute economic wealth in society. In socialism, such a role of the state would be natural and expected, but many citizens of post-socialist societies (probably older generations more than younger ones, as well as those employed in the state sector more than those in the private sector) are convinced that the state should do this despite the fact that the market economy functions on a completely different basis.

Data on acceptance of positions expressing redistributive statism are available only for two points in time, both from the post-socialist period (2012 and 2022). Therefore, we will not be able to include the views of respondents from the socialist period in the analysis, but it is reasonable to assume that the majority of the population looked favorably on the redistributive role of the state.

The data allow us to use the summative scale of redistributive statism in both time points, so the analysis will mainly focus on their use. The first thing to say is that the vast majority of respondents in both time points (2012 and 2022) accept the logic of state interventionism. In 2012, 75.9% of respondents fully accept redistributive statism, and 19.5% partially. The next survey, from 2022, confirms the findings that statist acceptance is deeply rooted among the population (81.6% of respondents fully accept redistributive statism, and 12.8% partially) (Table 5).

Table 5. *Scale of redistributive statism (2012, 2022)*
 – average standardized factor scores, arithmetic means and percentages
 (percentages refer to respondents who accept statist orientation)

Classes/strata									
Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Total
2012.	0,043	-0,046	-0,047	-0,044	0,129	0,043	-0,497	n.a.	0,010
2022.	-0,127	0,048	-0,359	0,095	-0,064	-0,029		0,013	0,011
2012.	4,74	4,68	4,70	4,70	4,78	4,74	4,50	n.a.	4,72*
2022.	4,52	4,63	4,37	4,66	4,56	4,58		4,61	4,61*
2012.	100,0	100,0	95,0	99,4	98,8	100,0	92,9	n.a.	99,0
2022.	88,9	94,4	81,8	90,8	88,0	87,5		89,8	90,1

*Scores from 4.00 to 5.00 mean strong acceptance of redistributive statism

This can also be seen if we look at the average scores. In 2012, the average score at the sample level was a very high 4.72, and ten years later it was 4.61 (Table 5). Considering the expressed agreement of the respondents regarding the acceptance of redistributive statism, it is logical to expect a high-value consistency. The data confirms this. The standard deviation is extremely low, in 2012 it was 0.449, and ten years later it was 0.665. In other words, there is a distinct normative-value dissonance, but also high value consistency. As we have pointed out earlier, we interpret this as an intra-systemic dissonance, i.e. the acceptance of a redistributive orientation should be interpreted as an attempt to find a solution to the growing existential problems of the population within the existing (capitalist) order, and not to strive for a return to the normative-institutional solutions from the socialist period (cf. Lazić and Pešić, 2013; Pešić, 2014). In other words, no social group (class, stratum, etc.) emerged that would be capable of fighting for a different, more humane social order. So, what kind of social order would be desirable? We have a clearer picture if we analyze individual items of redistributive statism. Almost nine out of ten respondents believe, in both time points (2012 and 2022), *that the government should provide a job for everyone who wants it, that the government should guarantee a minimum standard of living for everyone and that the state should intervene to reduce inequalities and protect the poor and the weak.*

Lastly, we will examine the relationship between the prevalence of redistributive statism and the class hierarchy of the respondents. ANOVA showed that there is no difference between classes/strata in the acceptance of statist orientation in both time points (in 2012: $F=1.225$; $p=0.292$; in 2022: $F=0.381$; $p=0.891$).

Without deeper analysis, it is difficult to say what the real reason is for such a large acceptance of redistributive statism. However, we assume that there were several reasons: the growth of the population's existential problems due to the economic crisis of 2008 and 2020, a long history of state interventionism in our region, the population's disappointment with the results of the post-socialist transformation (relatively slow economic recovery, low living standards, high unemployment, high level of corruption, etc.).

6. Conclusion

In the last three decades, the society of BiH has been going through the processes of post-socialist transformation and (re)modernization, the main drivers of which are the market economy based on the dominant role of private property and democratic governance based on political pluralism. In the paper, we examined whether the change in normative patterns due to the establishment of the capitalist system is accompanied by a change in social consciousness, i.e. in the value orientations that guide people in their social actions. We started from the assumption that basic value orientations in society change with the change of generations, younger generations accept different value orientations than older generations (Inglehart, Welzel, 2007; Kuljić, 2009).

The specificity of young generations in post-socialism (2012 and 2022) is that they grew up in a social order where the economic role of the state sought to be minimized, unlike the generation of young people who grew up in socialism (1989) when the state had a significant regulatory role. The aim of the study was to understand the attitudes of young people towards the economic role of the state in post-socialism and whether there has been a change in attitudes compared to the attitudes of young people in socialism. Differences in samples (in terms of territorial scope and sample structure) only allow for a rough tracking of changes in the attitudes of respondents at three time points – general trends. Comparative presentations of statistical indicators at three time points, which would allow for a more precise insight into value changes, are not possible. Therefore, research at all three time points is analyzed separately.

Using the theory of normative-value dissonance, which represents the parallels between new and old normative systems, as well as between new and old value orientations (Lazić, 2011), we examined the value orientations of young people related to the economic role of the state, in two social orders: socialist and post-socialist (capitalist). The research showed that normative-value dissonance was present among young people towards the end of socialism (1989), and it is reflected in the selective and limited spread of liberal value orientations, primarily among young people coming from those classes and strata that had the most interest in establishing a new, liberal-capitalist order. These were mostly members of the upper and middle class (managers and experts), but also the private-entrepreneurial class, including farmers, whose economic existence was based on private property and outside the dominant system of social relations. The normative-value dissonance, although not particularly pronounced, was systemic in its nature.

In the period of post-socialist transformation, research shows that normative-value dissonance is still present, but in the opposite direction. The new normative order that accepts the principles of economic liberalism (market-oriented economy and the dominant role of private property) is selectively accepted. It is about the „shallow rooting“ of liberal values, with a marked acceptance of state interventionism and the redistributive role of the state. Redistributive statism is a very widespread value orientation (almost nine out of ten respondents accept it), deeply rooted in all social classes and strata. In other words, there is a very widespread belief in the necessity of an active role of the state in the regulation of economic activities. This should be interpreted in the context of global and local circumstances that followed the process of post-socialist transformation in BiH, as well as historical factors. Among the global factors, we should mention the global financial and economic crisis of 2008, the economic crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, the energy crisis due to the war in Ukraine, and the increase in the price of food and basic groceries in recent years. Among the factors of the local context of post-socialist transformation, we can highlight the slow and insufficient progress in reform processes, the insufficient economy growth, especially in the private-entrepreneurial sector, poverty, corruption, and deep ethnic divisions in society (Janković, 2019), which altogether constitute

an unfavorable social context for economic development. Last but not least, we should mention the historical factors reflected in the long presence of the „egalitarian syndrome“ (Županov, 1970) and the population's habituation to state interventionism (Lazić, Pešić, 2012). These value orientations have been present in social consciousness for a long time, they have a trans-systemic character (Janković, 2020), and further reform efforts should recognize that.

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